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Fraunhofer Institute for High-Speed-Dynamics, Ernst-Mach-Institut, EMI, Germany. Formerly at: Institute
for the Protection of Maritime Infrastructures, German Aerospace Center, Germany.
E-mail: Corinna.Koepke@emi.fraunhofer.de
Frank Sill Torres
Institute for the Protection of Maritime Infrastructures, German Aerospace Center, Germany.
E-mail: Frank.SillTorres@dlr.de
The offshore wind industry experience a rising importance for the worldwide energy production, which is ac-
companied by increasing amount of wind turbines and Offshore Wind Farms (OWFs). However, due to its harsh
environment and its role for energy provision, OWFs are confronted with several threats that are impacting its safety
and security. Consequently, decision making at design as well as run time plays an important role for providing
safe and secure operation in OWFs. We propose in this work the application of a Bayesian Network (BN) for a
high-level representation of the safety and security state of an OWF. The developed BN-model is based on the safety
and security goals and related functions defined in Köpke et al. (2019). The derived model enables a user to analyze
the overall importance of high impact functions, like compliance, environmental protection, supply reliability or
accident prevention. Obtained results indicate that the proposed BN-model enables decision makers to explore
cross-system interrelations, and thus, to define requirements for implementations on lower design levels.
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1. Introduction
The offshore wind industry provides a reduced
emission form of energy production that is contin-
uously gaining importance in the world-wide en-
ergy provision with annual growth rates of nearly
30% (see O’Sullivan, 2020). In 2019, Europe
had a total offshore wind energy production of
67 TWh, which corresponds to 2.3% of the total
EU electricity consumption (Komusanac et al.,
2020). This trend also has economic implications,
reflected by the prediction that by 2030 the off-
shore wind power shall be responsible for 8% of
the total ocean economy adding USD 230 billion
of value (OECD, 2016).
However, Offshore Wind Farms (OWFs) are
confronted with plenty safety and security threats.
This results mainly from its harsh environment,
the considerable complexity as well as its role
as a relevant power generation system. For ex-
ample, failing components are recurring obstacles
in OWFs requiring well-established maintenance
processes (Carroll et al., 2016). These processes,
though, are prone to further challenges in terms of
safety and security.
Several works have focused on the employment
of indicators for supporting the assessment of
the safety level of OWFs. For example, Pfaffel
et al. (2019) discuss the application of Key Perfor-
mance Indicators (KPIs) for the operational man-
agement of offshore and onshore wind turbines.
Seyr and Muskulus (2016) analyze safety specific
indicators for OWF and conclude that most of
the indicators applied today are relevant when
compared to reported incident data. Furthermore,
Gonzalez et al. (2017) review KPIs for the op-
eration and maintenance of offshore and onshore
wind farms.
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However, indicator-based solutions are re-
stricted by the vast complexity and multitude of
stakeholders of OWFs. Consequently, only few
works discuss the interrelation between require-
ments in terms of safety and security as well as
economy, environment and compliance with reg-
ulations (see for example Aghahowa and Allen,
2007). Based on this observation, Köpke et al.
chose a different approach by using a functional
model (see Section 3 of Köpke et al., 2019). The
authors identified and classified the main stake-
holder goals in OWFs and employed the Func-
tional Resonance Analysis Method (FRAM; Holl-
nagel and Goteman, 2004; Hollnagel, 2012) in or-
der to represent the correspondent relations. Fur-
thermore, the authors integrated a straightforward
probabilistic model and Monte-Carlo simulations
for the determination of the functions of OWFs
that are most susceptible to failures.
In this work, we propose an extension of this
model by adopting a Bayesian Network Analysis
(BNA), which leads to a more formal approach
for exploring relations within OWFs in terms of
safety and security. Using the resulting model and
with help of expert knowledge one can determine
how a failing function impact other functions in
this complex system as well as to help to how
design changes, e.g. the hardening of selected
functions, influence the system stability.
The rest of this work is structured as follows.
Section 2 reviews the identified safety and secu-
rity goals. Section 3 describes the methodology
adopted in this work. The model is presented on
Section 4. The results and implications are dis-
cussed in Section 5. Conclusions are summarized
in Section 6.
2. OWF safety and security goals
This section reviews the safety and security goals
in OWFs and discusses a functional model of
OWF presented in previous works.
2.1. Stakeholder perspective
In order to derive safety and security goals, Köpke
et al. (2019) identified stakeholders and their ob-
jectives in the field of OWFs. Stakeholders are
e.g. owners, operators, work-managers, coast-
guards, vessel and air traffic services. The authors
continued to analyze their tasks and objectives in
the OWF and proceeded to classify their goals in
nine different categories (see Table 1).
Table 1. OWF safety and security goals
taken from Köpke et al. (2019).










It is important to note that the goals are inter-
related. It means any change in the status of any
category may have an impact on the others. For
example, if the surveillance of an OWF is not
sufficient in a way that it leads to an accident.
Then the safety of the plant may most likely be
compromised; namely a change in accident pre-
vention decreases the plant safety and may even
affect security.
Subsequently, Köpke et al. focused on five
safety and security goals, i.e. #1, #2, #4, #5,
and #7 (see Table 1). They detailed these five
objectives in 64 different functions. The functions
are presented in Table 2 where they are organized
in sub-categories, namely: i) detailed safety and
security goals (function #1 to 21), ii) safety and
security measures (function #22 to 53), and iii)
analysis of sensor data (function #54 to 64) (see
Table 1 of Köpke et al., 2019).
2.2. Probabilistic FRAM model
In Köpke et al. (2019), interrelations between
safety and security goals as well as all the func-
tions in Table 2 are defined. These relations were
implemented using a FRAM-model. Based on the
interrelated functions, the authors proceed to carry
out a Monte Carlo simulation where each function
had three features, i.e. i) a scalar which repre-
sented the probability to fail, ii) a scalar providing
the time (in days) it takes to restore the function
when it got broken, and iii) a factor with which
that particular function may influence the ones it
is related to.
In this work, we are using the FRAM-model in
order to implement the BN-model in Sect. 4. The
failure probabilities given in Table 2 represent the
probability of being false F . Conditional proba-
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Table 2. List of all functions with probability to fail p and influencing factor f. ROV (Remotly Operated Vehicle), OSS (Offshore
Sub-Station), Unexploded Ordnance, PPE (Personal Protection Equipment), AIS (Automated Identification System), CMS (Condition
Monitoring System), EPIRP (Emergency Position-Indicating Radio Beacon), CCTV (Close-Circuit TeleVision), PLB (Personal Life
Beacon).
# Function name p f # Function name p f
1 Protect plants L L 33 Firefighting L H
2 Protect water quality M M 34 Fire detection L H
3 Protect whales L L 35 Safe transfer L H
4 Protect fish L L 36 Measures Helicopter L H
5 Protect birds L L 37 Measures climbing M M
6 Protect bats L L 38 Measures diving M M
7 Safety plane L H 39 Rescue chain L H
8 Safety helicopter M H 40 Telemedicine M M
9 Safety ship M H 41 Shelter L M
10 Safety ROV H L 42 Regular maintenance L H
11 Safety submarine L H 43 Traffic control L M
12 Protect foundation L H 44 Guard vessel M L
13 Protect tower L H 45 PPE M L
14 Protect rotor/nacelle M H 46 Landing area M L
15 Protect cable L H 47 Trainings L L
16 Protect OSS L H 48 Decompression chamber L L
17 Protect converter station L H 49 IT-security M H
18 Safety of worker M M 50 Prevent espionage L H
19 Shipwrecked men rescued L L 51 Repel attacks L H
20 Safe communication M M 52 Avoid manipulation L H
21 Safe data L M 53 Access Control L H
22 Avoid pollutants L H 54 Observe leakage L M
23 Bubble curtain L L 55 Observe water quality L M
24 Observe population L L 56 AIS L H
25 Avoid collision plant/animal M M 57 Weather data M M
26 Collision avoidance L M 58 Heat detection L H
27 Sonar transponder L M 59 Smoke detection L H
28 Warning lights M M 60 CMS L M
29 Weather measures M M 61 EPIRB L H
30 UXO clearance L H 62 People tracking L M
31 Avoid technical failure M M 63 CCTV M M
32 Lightning protection L H 64 PLB M L
Source: Table adopted from Köpke et al. (2019).
bilities are derived from these basic failure prob-
abilities influenced by adjacent functions and the
respective factors f (see Sections 3.1 and 4). The
restoration times are not employed as in Köpke
et al. (2019), they were only used in their work
to carry out the Monte-Carlo simulation. The
probability of failure p has the values of low (L,
0.005), medium (M, 0.015) and high (H, 0.02).
The factor to influence functions f has the values
of low (L, 1.05), medium (M, 1.2) and high (H,
1.35), as adopted in Köpke et al. (2019, see also
Table 2).
3. Methodology
This section presents preliminary information re-
garding the theory behind Bayesian Networks as
well as the supporting programming library.
3.1. Bayesian Networks− BNs
BNs are one of the most popular probabilistic
graphical models. Its application are wide and
vary from Computer Vision to support of Medi-
cal Diagnosis (for some examples see Zhou and
Huang, 2006; Luciani et al., 2003). BNs are Di-
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rected Acylic Graphs − DAGs − which represent
random variables and their conditional dependen-
cies. BNs combine the DAGs with probability
theory to provide practical means for representing
and updating probabilities about events of interest.
In order to do so, BNs make use of the Bayes rule
for calculation of the posterior estimate.
Lets consider two different variables A and B,
where their probabilities are expressed as P (A)
and P (B), respectively. The conditional proba-
bility P (A|B), following Bayes rule, is given by:
P (A|B) = P (B|A) ∗ P (A)
P (B)
(1)
where in Eq. 1, P (A) is the prior estimate,
P (B) is the marginal probability of B, P (B|A) is
the likelihood, which is the probability of B given
A. Finally, P (A|B) is known as the posterior
distribution, which is the probability of A given
B.
The DAG consists of nodes and a set of edges.
As its name suggests, the nodes are directly con-
nected. Figure 1 shows an exemplary schematic
representation of such a DAG. In this example, one
of the edges goes from A to C, meaning that C is
the child of A and at the same time A is the parent
of C and D. In the same way, one can continue
and mention the rest of the sets of parents and
child of the representation shown in this figure.
In this formulation the nodes can either be in-
dependent or dependent. In Fig. 1 the node A and
B are the independent nodes and C, D, and E are
the dependent nodes. For each dependent node,
its probability value is provided by a Conditional
Probability Table (CPT) on the parent node(s),
respectively. Such CPT contains one probability
value for every possible combination of child and
parent states (Murphy, 2012).
Lets assume a BN with the following structure
(X,E), where X represents the random variables
X = {x1, x2, ..., xN} of the nodes and E rep-
resents the edges with conditional independent
probabilities between the nodes. The join prob-











Fig. 1. Schematic representation of the DAG.
besides Par(xi) denotes the set of parent nodes
of the random variable xi. The nodes outside
Par(xi) are conditionally independent of xi.
3.2. Pomegranate
In order to implement our BN-model, we made use
of pomegranate (Schreiber, 2017), which is a ma-
chine learning package. It has implemented sev-
eral probabilistic models; such as: General Mix-
ture, Markov Chains, Bayesian Networks, Naive
Bayes, etc. Its great advantage is that: (i) it is
an open source package, (b) it works with Python
and its implementation is being done in Cython in
order to speed up the calculations, and iii) it allows
multi-threaded parallel execution so that can han-
dle big amount of data. Therefore, Schreiber made
pomegranate a versatile tool ready to be applied to
a wide variety of cases.
4. Bayesian Model for safety and
security
This section presents a model that relies on
Bayesian Networks (BNs) and permits the investi-
gation of safety and security goals in OWFs. First,
we introduce the parametrization of the proba-
bilities adopted for the independent nodes, i.e.
discrete distributions, and dependent nodes, i.e.
CPTs. This is followed by the presentation of the
implemented OWF BN-model.
4.1. Parametrization
A common challenge of BNs is the definition of
the probabilities. If sufficient data are available
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one can employ e.g. the maximum likelihood
approach Le Cam (1990) or other learning tech-
niques. However, for high-level abstractions as
considered inhere, one has to rely mostly on ex-
pert knowledge (Lichte and Wolf, 2019). Here,
we make use of expert knowledge provided in
Section 2. Table 2 summarizes this knowledge by
introducing the failure probability and the influ-
ence factor for each node as described in Köpke
et al. (2019).
In our BN approach, the probability P of a node
N being true T or false F depends on whether the
node is dependent or independent of other nodes.
For independent nodes, the probability of failure,
i.e. P (N = F ), and the probability of functional
as desired, i.e. P (N = T ), are given by the
following discrete distribution:
P (Ni = F ) = pi (3)
P (Ni = T ) = 1− pi (4)
where pi refers to the probability of failure of
node Ni given in Table 2.
For the dependent nodes, probabilities of being
true T or false F are given by conditional proba-
bilities, i.e. CPTs, dependent on their parent nodes
(see Section 3.1). Assuming that the node Ni is
now a dependent node, it has a set of M parent
nodes, i.e. Par(Ni) = {X1, X2, ..., XM}. The
conditional probability of failure for the depen-
dent node is given by:







1 if P (Xj = T )
fj otherwise
The factor fj is given along with pi in Table 2.
The probability of a dependent node working as
desired is given as:
P (Ni = T |Par(Ni)) = 1−P (Ni = F |Par(Ni)).
Finally, equations 3-5 are employed to deter-
mine the probabilities used as input values for the
safety and security BN-model of the OWF.
4.2. Generic OWF model
Having the probabilities, we can then proceed to
work out our model based on the interrelations
defined in the FRAM-model (see Section 2 and
Köpke et al., 2019).
Figure 2 shows the overall safety and security
model of a generic OWF as directed acylic graph.
In this representation, the sixty-four (64) functions
of Table 2 become the nodes and their relations
the edges. The nodes are formed by: (i) goals,
(ii) measures, and (iii) analysis of sensor data.
There are in total twenty seven (27) independent
and thirty-seven (37) dependent nodes, respec-
tively. The independent nodes are boldfaced in
the first column of Table 1. This model has been
implemented as a BN-model by using python-
pomegranate (see Section 3.2; Schreiber, 2017).
After all values of the BN-model have been
computed, each node inherits the probability of
P (T ) and P (F ), which corresponds to the prob-
ability of whether that node is functional or nota.
That probability, i.e. whether a node is functional
or not, depends on the joint probability. For the
dependent nodes, the joint probability is a func-
tion that considers the probabilities of the nodes
on its incoming edges and the probability of the
node itself, which is represented via its CPT (see
equation 2 in Section 3.1). For example, in Fig-
ure 2, the value of node Avoid Pollutants depends
on the nodes Observe Leakage as well as Observe
Water Quality.
5. Results and Discussions
This Section explores the implemented and pa-
rameterized BN-model and discusses the results.
5.1. Initial State
Figure 3 shows the resulting distribution of P (F )
for each node in the network. Besides, the average
failure probability of the network is P (F ) =
0.008 ± 0.005. As expected, the results are sim-
ilar to the ones reported in Köpke et al. (2019).
However, in contrast to what was determined by
Köpke et al., the most susceptible node is Safety
ROV, and not Safety of worker. While the latter
has a probability of failure of P (F ) = 0.0153
(node number # 18 in Table 2), the former has
probability of failure with P (F ) = 0.0201 (node
number # 10).
aThe sum of both needs to add up to one, i.e. P (T )+P (F ) =
1.
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This results mainly from the different way of
carrying out the analysis. While the authors in
Köpke et al. (2019) analyzed the varying failure
rate over time, the inference executed in here
determines the overall probability.
5.2. Variations of the initial model
In order to explore the applicability of the de-
veloped model, we modified the failure proba-
bility of the independent nodes and determined
the impact on the model (see Figure 4 for the
ratios of the new failure probabilities). In de-
tail, we decreased the failure probability of these
nodes by 20 % (red stars in Figure 4), while in
the second experiment we increased the failure
probability by 20 % (green triangles). Figure 4a
depicts the overall view of the resulting failure
probability. The decreased and increased failure
probabilities of the independent nodes is clearly
noticeable, i.e. the indicators with values of 0.8
and 1.2, respectively, while the failure probability
of the dependent nodes varied only slightly. The
resulting change of these failure probabilities is
more apparent in the zoomed in view shown in
Figure 4b.
For example, in the first experiment, the prob-
ability of failure of the function Collision avoid-
ance (node number # 26 in Table 2) decreased by
a factor 0.998 as a consequence of the decrease
in the failure probability of its incoming functions
(node numbers # 27, 28, 43, 44, 56; see also
Figure 2). In the second experiment, the probabil-
ity of failure of the same function (node number
# 26) increased by a factor of 1.002, given the
increase of the failure probability of its incoming
parameters. Similarly, it can be explained the
remaining nodes in the BN-model.
Finally, one can argue that this relatively low
change follows from the low failure probability
and factor values initially determined by the ex-
perts. Nevertheless, these results clearly indicate
the strength of the implemented BN-model. It
enables decision makers to explore the impact
of failure probabilities on the whole system and,
based on that, extract requirements for the imple-
mentation of each node.
6. Conclusions
We introduced a Bayesian Network (BN) model
for the high-level representation of the safety and
security state of a generic Offshore Wind Farm
Fig. 3. Probability failure P (F ) value obtained in the model
as a function of each of the siyty-four nodes. In the x-axis it is
used a number for the node Ni provided in Table 2.
(a) Overall view
(b) Zoomed in view
Fig. 4. Ratio of failure probability Pnew(F ) with respect to
P (F ) for two cases; namely: i) pi of the independent nodes
decreased by 20 % (red stars) and ii) pi of the independent
nodes increased by 20 % (green triangles).
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(OWF). The nodes of the model represent the
main functions within an OWF, which can be
functional or not, while the edges mean the corre-
spondent relations. Obtained results indicate that
the developed BN-model enables the exploration
of the interrelations between all functions in terms
of failures on high abstraction level, and thus,
permits the extractions of requirements for the
implementations of the functionality of an OWF.
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